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Abstract
Mahurin, Andrew M.I. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State 
University, 2007. The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection on 
Economic Growth.
This paper tests whether stronger intellectual property protection is good for a 
country. It focuses on the overall effect of intellectual property protection on per capita 
economic growth. To measure the strength of intellectual property protection, I use the 
Ginarte-Park index. An education and an investment variable are also included in the 
models.
The models are based on simple linear regressions involving a cross-section of 
countries. The models consistently showed a negative correlation between intellectual 
property protection and per capita economic growth. Moreover, I tested to see if the 
effect is different in some countries than in others, based on an interaction with either 
education or investment levels. No conclusive interaction was found. Finally, I divided 
the sample into two sections, based on whether each country had a high or low level of 
intellectual property protection. The negative correlation between intellectual property 
protection and economic growth was weaker statistically for the group of countries with 
high intellectual-property protection levels.
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Preface
It is good to know about the biases, background, and experiences of a researcher. 
It is also good to know about a researcher’s goals and expectations for doing a certain 
type of research. All of these can affect the way research is conducted, the way theories 
are built, and the way data is interpreted.
In regards to the possibility of bias, I am a fan of open-source software products 
such as Linux. The whole idea of open-source software has made me question whether 
copyright law should be structured the way it is, or whether there is a better system. My 
perspective is also influenced by my educational background. During my undergraduate 
studies, I studied music composition. The music that I wrote is protected by copyright 
law, and I always put a copyright notice on the bottom of every new composition. So, 
balancing these two influences, I think my bias was neutral overall.
I spent 2006 in China, and some of the observations I made affected the 
development of my theory section. To me, China is a good example of a developing 
country, and the United States is a good example of a developed country.
There are several areas that can be researched as a follow up to this paper. First, 
it would be good to know more about the motivations that cause an individual country to 
increase its intellectual property protection. Such a study would branch off into political 
science, sociology, or psychology, depending on whether decisions are being traced to a 
political process, a social phenomenon, or individual decision makers. It would be good 
to know how an individual country was expecting to benefit from such a change. This
paper is written from the assumption that many countries institute intellectual-property 
protection systems as part of their economic growth strategies.
A second area of possible research is related to the first. If countries typically 
manage their intellectual property protection systems based on an economic growth 
strategy, how does the intellectual property system fit into their overall strategy? 
Individual countries could be analyzed this way, taking into account the individual 
country’s entire growth strategy. Since similar countries often pursue similar growth 
strategies, groups of similar countries could be also analyzed in this way.
I am grateful for all who have helped make this paper possible. I am grateful to 
my mother, who encouraged me to always keep busy, doing something useful for society. 
This ideal led me to start pursuing a Master’s degree. After I had finished my class work 
required for the degree, many people gave me encouragement so that I would not leave 
the degree unfinished by not completing the thesis. I am thankful to them, all of them, 
whether I can remember what they said or just how I reacted.
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Introduction
Economic growth is one of the most fundamental issues of economics. Adam 
Smith was interested in this subject when he wrote his famous book in 1776, The Wealth 
of Nations. We are still interested in this subject today. How does a nation increase its 
wealth? This is the key question of so many economic papers. This paper will study the 
impact of intellectual-property protection.
Intellectual-property protection affects society in so many ways. Scientists, 
engineers, artists, writers, and many others are all creators of intellectual property. Much 
of what we buy contains some sort of copyright, patent, trademark, or other form of 
intellectual property protection. This is seen as necessary because we are in an age of 
mass production.
Mass production allows a small idea to benefit everyone, if it is made public. In 
our society, many creators of ideas expect to be rewarded monetarily, or they will not 
share their ideas. Intellectual property systems exist to help the creators of ideas sell their 
ideas. As more ideas are shared in the marketplace, society more easily can create value 
from its limited physical resources. This contributes to economic growth.
This paper analyzes the relationship between the strength of intellectual property 
protection and the rate of economic growth. To make this analysis, a sound understanding 
of economic growth is necessary.
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Literature Review
There is significant literature on growth theory in general, on intellectual 
property, and on the interaction between intellectual property and economic growth. 
Papers on economic growth provide a framework for building a good economic growth 
model (Paul Romer 1986; Romer 1990; Robert Lucas 1988). Papers on intellectual 
property rights (Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind 1991) give an overview of the 
current laws and how economists usually look at them. Finally, papers on the interaction 
between intellectual property and various aspects of economic growth (Zvi Griliches 
1990; Juan C. Ginarte and Walter G. Park 1997) provide a basis of comparison for my 
own work.
1. Literature on Economic Growth
Manuel S. Santos (2002) says that “there is no model to account for a minimal set 
of basic facts or empirical regularities in the area of growth and development” (p. 1). In 
other words, no mathematical model has been completely satisfactory in explaining 
economic growth, however, certain growth theories have become recognized over the 
years as being important.
The most dominant economic growth theory was developed by Paul Romer 
(Romer 1986; Romer 1990; Ronald Bailey 2001; Romer forthcoming 2007). Romer 
emphasizes the role of human capital (especially education), physical capital 
(investment), and the amount of existing ideas and designs (patents). These three lead to 
the development of new useful chemicals, new machines, and more manufactured
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products for consumption. Whatever wealth is not consumed is reinvested to become 
physical capital for future growth.
Paul Romer (1986) modified the views of earlier authors by saying that without 
technological growth, an economy would eventually reach a steady state, a point at which 
further increases of income per capita would be impossible. When technological growth 
is added to the model, continuous growth is possible.
Paul Romer’s model often is referred to as the New Growth Theory (Olivier 
Blanchard 2003). Previous theories had focused on savings, investments, and capital 
accumulation. New growth theory adds the role of technological change, and tries to 
investigate its causes (Blanchard 2003 pp. 243-266, and pp. 572-581).
One of Santos’ (2002) objections to current models is that they cannot completely 
explain why some countries become relatively rich, while others stay relatively poor.
The idea of convergence says that poor countries eventually should catch the rich 
countries, closing the gap between rich and poor. Santos criticized the idea of 
convergence, because in his opinion it did not match the data.
Romer (1990) and Robert Lucas (1988) both give discussions that explain why 
some countries grow faster than others. According to Romer (1990), for every level of 
knowledge, there is an optimal level of production and research. Production faces 
increasing returns to scale, while research faces diminishing returns to scale. Research 
produces knowledge, and investments in research are more profitable as the level of 
knowledge increases. This will cause more advanced economies to grow at a more rapid 
rate than poor countries with little technology. This effect will be limited by technology 
spillovers between countries.
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According to Lucas (1988), countries specialize in a good according to 
comparative advantage. Learning by doing causes the comparative advantage to increase. 
If two goods are substitutes, the country that specializes in the more learning-intensive 
good should experience higher growth rates. In the same article, he wrote that learning 
by doing and formal schooling both create positive externalities.
Within this new area of research, the most important variable seems to be 
education (Alan B. Krueger and Mikael Lindahl 2001; Santos 2002; Romer 1986). 
Investment is also an important variable to include, and also is included by Santos (2002) 
in his model.
Education is important in this literature in several ways. It relates to Romer’s 
(1990) idea of human capital, which is required to push the level of technology forward. 
It relates to Romer’s (1990) discussion on the optimal level of investment in research, 
because this is based on the level of knowledge, and education plays a role in a society’s 
level of knowledge. Finally, it plays a role in Lucas’ (1988) discussion of comparative 
advantage, because a society that is more educated should have more comparative 
advantage in learning-intensive industries.
In addition, Jennifer Cheeseman Day and Eric C. Newburger (2002) and the 
United States Census Bureau (2005) show how education increases the average income 
of those who pursue it. If income is representative of productivity, then this is evidence 
that education tends to improve productivity.
Santos (2002) cites gradual productivity improvement as one of two ways that 
economists usually have explained economic growth. The other type of explanation is a 
capital-accumulation model. Education also can fit into a capital-accumulation model,
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because it can be accumulated by gradually investing resources into it. Once acquired, it 
has a productive value, and can be used to further expand production.
2. Economic Theory and Intellectual Property Protection
Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind (1991) provide the best introduction to a 
study of intellectual property law. Besen and Raskind (1991) discuss the main categories 
of intellectual property law, including copyrights, patents, trade secrets, and a special law 
for computer chip manufacturing. They trace the history of patents to the Constitution, 
and give the basic reasoning behind the patent system.
The primary goal of an intellectual property system is to promote innovation, by 
giving monopoly rights to innovators (United States Patent and Trademark Office 2005; 
Besin and Raskind 1991; Perelman 2003). Monopoly rights give high profits to those 
who own them, but cause a deadweight loss to society by decreasing the output and 
reducing the availability of products that have been patented (Paul H. Jensen and 
Elizabeth Webster 2004; Besen and Raskind 1991). These monopoly rights are seen as 
necessary because “private producers have an incentive to invest in innovation only if 
they receive an appropriate return” (Besen and Raskind 1991, p. 5).
Besen and Raskind (1991) do not define “appropriate return.” This can be a 
source of contention, because often neither society nor the inventor can know the 
importance of an innovation until after it is created, marketed, and put in use. Different 
types of innovations require different processes in order to be developed.
Nancy T. Gallini (2002) gives another introductory paper, focusing on recent 
changes in patent law. She lists the changes as broadening the scope of the patent law to
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cover new areas (such as biotechnology), increasing the ability of patent holders to 
enforce their claims in court (citing a court decision), and lengthening the term of patents. 
Gallini discusses whether these changes encourage more innovation, more disclosure, and 
/or more technology transfer. Gallini also discusses certain side-effects and costs of the 
recent changes.
Gallini (2002) concludes that the economic impact should be hard to measure at 
this point, because not enough time has passed since the recent changes. The impact of 
stronger patents (patents that are easier to enforce in court, and have longer terms) may 
be mixed.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 protects the design of a computer 
chip from being copied or reverse engineered by a competing manufacturer, for ten years 
(Besen and Raskind 2000). This is a recent development. It illustrates how the law has 
reacted to the development of the computer chip industry.
As technology progresses forward, other categories may come into existence, for 
example, computers. We need to evaluate our intellectual property laws periodically to 
find how they can be optimized for the modem economy.
A few authors have advocated specific changes to our intellectual property laws 
and customs. Mikko Mustonen (2005) and Nicholas Petreley (2001) advocate open 
source software. Danny Quah (2002) advocates the free usage, copying, modification, 
and reselling of all innovations. Quah’s argument is that the cost of a copied innovation, 
like a copy of computer software, is basically costless.
The term open-source was invented by Eric Raymond (2000), and refers to 
software which has its source code open to the public. Eric Raymond believed that he
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could write software more efficiently if he posted the source code of his partially 
complete program on the Internet. He received feedback from other computer enthusiasts 
who were interested in his program, and he completed his program easily. The open- 
source movement has been gaining in popularity in recent years, however, this way of 
thinking has not been advocated by many mainstream economists.
Many papers have been written which advocate weaker intellectual property 
protection. Those who favor less intellectual property protection say that developing 
countries often cannot afford to license technology developed abroad. Graham Dutfield 
(2005) focuses on the specifics of AIDS drugs, complaining that patent laws can restrict 
the amount of necessary drugs which enter a country.
The recent trend in intellectual property protection has been towards a more 
uniform system at the international level (Phillip McCalman 2001; Mark S. Massel 1973; 
Gene M. Grossman 1991). McCalman (2001) discusses how this trend has led to 
transfers of wealth to the United States, which has historically had higher levels of IPR 
protection. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Fansisco’s FRBSF Economic Newsletter 
(Diego Valderrama 2004) discusses how such transfers of wealth have led to some 
tension between relatively developed and relatively undeveloped countries.
To understand and possibly resolve this tension, it is necessary to understand how 
intellectual property protection systems affect various aspects of an economy, and 
whether the net effect on economic growth is positive or negative.
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3. Previous Research on Intellectual Property and Economic Growth
Several authors have described relationships between intellectual property and 
certain measures of economic health (Griliches 1990; Grossman 1991; Gallini 2002; 
McCalman 2001). As a group, these authors show an indirect chain of events that should 
lead to the technological growth necessary for continuous economic expansion under 
New Growth Theory. For example, Gallini (2002) anecdotally links the relationship 
between intellectual property protection and the number of patents; and Griliches (1990) 
uses the number of patents as a reflection of innovation.
There are two main strands of empirical research concerning intellectual property 
and economic growth, stemming from two separate sources of data. The first uses patent 
data as a measure of technological growth, following the example of Zvi Griliches 
(1990).
A second source of data is an index developed by Juan C. Ginarte and Walter G. 
Park (Ginarte and Park 1997; Park and Ginarte 1997; Park 2001). It is known as the 
Ginarte-Park index, and used by many other researchers as well (Martin Falk 2004; Peter 
Nunnenkamp and Julius Spatz 2003). The Ginarte-Park index divides intellectual 
property protection into several categories, assigning one point for each category. The 
categories include patent length, treaty participation, scope of patent coverage, and 
enforcement of patent-rights in court. Other indexes have been developed, each with its 
own benefits and drawbacks (W. Lesser 2001).
The Ginarte-Park index measures treaty participation, patent length, the scope of 
patent protection, and the amount of patent enforcements in the courts. Each of these 
areas have one point each in the index, so subcategories have a fraction of a point.
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Other papers do not include an econometric model. Michael Perlman (2003) 
gives a history of how stronger intellectual property protection actually has slowed the 
rate of technological progression, at least in specific areas. His examples focus on 
electronics, from the radio to the microchip.
The non-econometric papers which advocate stronger intellectual property often 
relate their arguments to finance. Some consider weak intellectual property protection as 
a deterrent to foreign direct investment. Others consider intellectual-property protection 
as a good source of endogenous growth, because firms within an economy will be more 
likely to finance research and development if their innovations are protected properly 
(Michael J. Mandel 2004; Massel 1973; Valderama 2004).
Empirical papers often show that intellectual property protection has a positive 
effect. Lesser (2001) and the literature he reviews show that intellectual property 
protection has a positive effect on foreign direct investment. Falk (2004) lists patent 
rights as one of the many factors of research and development intensity, and finds that it 
has a positive effect.
Contrasting with previous research
Much of the existing research tends to look at the issue in the same ways, leading 
to similar results. Empirical researchers almost always find some positive effect of 
intellectual property protection. Unlike previous research which used foreign direct 
investment as the dependent variable (Beata Smarzynska Javorcik 2004; Nunnenkamp 
and Spatz 2003), this project uses economic growth as the dependent variable. The 
advantage is that it measures the total effect of the intellectual property system, instead of
9
one component. The disadvantage is that the economy as a whole is very complex, and 
many other variables are also involved.
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Theory
In this paper I hope to test the statistical significance of the Ginarte-Park 
intellectual property rights (IPR) index as a determinant of economic growth. To build a 
theoretical model, I will start with a restatement of New Growth Theory in my own 
words, and then I will show how intellectual property protection fits into the model.
New growth theory says that economic growth is a function of investment and 
technological growth. When technological growth is limited, economic growth is also 
limited, as the economy approaches a steady state.
Technological growth has two sources, one endogenous and the other exogenous. 
Endogenous technological growth originates only from innovations within an economic 
system, or in most cases within an individual nation. Some innovation is a result of 
investments in research and development. Other innovation comes as a result of non- 
market forces. Both of these types of endogenous innovation are benefited by the level of 
education.
Exogenous technological growth occurs as a result of incorporating technologies 
from other cultures. This can happen gradually, as a result of openness to foreign 
influences; or it can happen quickly, as a result of a modernization effort. Either way, the 
process first requires the ability to imitate and copy foreign products, machines, and 
manufacturing processes. This results in low cost, relatively low quality products. To 
advance further, a developing nation must develop an understanding of the products that 
it chooses to manufacture, as well as the machines and processes that are used.
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Some of the knowledge that is necessary can be acquired over time through 
leaming-by-doing. The rest can be acquired through targeted educational programs. In 
this way, education is tied to both exogenous and endogenous technological growth. The 
introduction of an intellectual property system changes all of this.
An intellectual property system rewards innovation and encourages more 
investment in research and development. By requiring a description of his or her 
invention, the intellectual property system promotes disclosure, especially from 
innovations that occur outside of research and development. In exchange for this 
disclosure, the system promises monopoly rewards. These monopoly rewards cause 
deadweight losses and other side effects.
The main effect of the intellectual property system is to create a marketplace for 
ideas. In other words, the presence of intellectual property laws formalizes the rules for 
the marketplace, and international agreements expand the marketplace beyond the 
borders of an individual country. An international marketplace for innovations increases 
the potential market for all innovations, thereby increasing both the incentive to innovate, 
but also increasing deadweight loss.
If foreign and domestic patents are treated equally, all innovation is treated as if it 
is endogenous. This reduces and regulates the amount of exogenous technological 
growth as defined in this study. With the addition of an intellectual property system, 
poor countries may no longer absorb foreign technology freely. If they wish to copy 
something which is protected by a patent, they must usually pay a royalty to the patent 
holder. This is good for the patent holder, but bad for those that live in the poor 
countries.
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In the case of a developed country, exogenous technological growth will also be 
reduced. In both cases, the system of rewards is designed to promote endogenous 
technological growth, but since all innovations are treated equally, they are all treated as 
if they come from within the culture.
The effect of an intellectual property system will have both a positive component 
and a negative component. The primary effect will be to increase investment in research 
and development, both at home and abroad. This is the positive component. The 
secondary effect will be to limit the availability of recent innovations. Both effects will 
be stronger if there is more education and investment capital available.
On the positive side, intellectual property systems create more demand for higher 
education to be used in research and development. On the negative side, firms often use 
a portion of their resources to reengineer and recreate innovations already in the 
marketplace, to avoid paying high royalties (Yum K. Kwan and Edwin L.-C. Lai 2003).
In other words, the intellectual property system uses education and other 
resources inefficiently, but at least we could say that more people are pursuing education 
and conducting research. Even though there are positive externalities associated with 
both research and education (Lucas 1988), the externalities from research mainly affects 
the countries in which the research takes place (Grossman 1991). For developing 
countries, most of the research is occurring outside of their boarders, so this externality 
does not affect them.
On the negative side, the intellectual property system limits the use local 
investment resources. It prevents manufacturers from making products which are simply 
copies and imitations of existing products. This limits the availability of low cost, low
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quality products. The availability of these low cost, low quality products does not 
substantially affect the quality of life in developed nations, but for developing nations, it 
can be very important. For poor and developing countries, copying foreign technology is 
not only a morally acceptable solution, but in some cases the most efficient step forward 
in the path towards development. As an economy develops, copying rather than 
innovating becomes both morally unacceptable and less practical, as consumers demand 
better and better products.
On the positive side, this protects both the foreign investor and the investor that 
has put a lot of resources into the creation of a certain product. By protecting the rights 
of foreign investors, an intellectual property system promotes foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The effects of FDI should be stronger in countries that have IP systems that are 
similar to the advanced western markets.
The net effect of an intellectual property system is the sum of these positive and 
negative effects listed above. Education, investment, and the strength of intellectual 
property protection all interact to produce technological growth, but the strength of 
intellectual property protection limits the widespread availability of such technology. By 
including a variable to represent the strength of intellectual property protection, one can 
find out whether the net effect of intellectual property protection on economic growth is 
positive or negative.
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Model
The goal of this part of the paper is to test the effect of intellectual property 
protection on economic growth, using the Ginarte-Park intellectual property rights (IPR) 
index. To do this, we need to start with a reasonable model that does not include the 
intellectual property rights index, and later add the index to the model.
I used the growth rate in the real GDP per capita between 1990 and the end of 
1994 (“GRWB7”) as my dependent variable. (“GRWB7” is the name of the variable 
from the Barro-Lee data set.)
An educational attainment variable from 1990 was chosen based on its relative 
ability to model economic growth in a single variable model. “LSM90” seemed to be the 
strongest of the educational attainment variables from the Barro-Lee data set. “LSM90” 
refers to high school attainment in the male (“M”) population 25 years or older.
For convenience, the education has been renamed as “School_1990”. I would 
rather use an index for educational attainment than a single variable, but constructing an 
index results in reducing the number of usable observations. By itself, school attainment 
is able to predict .079 of the variation in growth rates. Table 1 shows that higher 
graduation rates among males in 1990 are associated with higher economic growth 
between 1990 and 1994. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1: Preliminary Model Development
Step 1 Step 2
Intercept 0.0048 -03 • "
(.01) (-4.43)
School_1990 0.0597 0.0N
(2.9) (2.9)
Invest95 - 0.174
— (5.49)
R2 .079 .3095
Observations Used 100 99
Next, I added a variable for investment which occurred between the beginning of 
1990 and the end of 1994. The “INVWB7” investment variable was chosen from the 
Barro-Lee data set, because it is calculated similarly to the economic growth variable.
For convenience, I refer to this variable as “Invest95,” because it shows the amount of 
investment in the five year period ending just before the first day of 1995. Table 1 shows 
the first and second steps in developing the model. Including the investment variable 
increases the R figure to around 30%.
As a final step, we can now add the Ginarte-Park intellectual property rights index 
(“IPR_1990”) to the model. This index was produced by Ginarte and Park. The index 
reflects what types of patents are covered, treaty participation, whether a patent can lose 
its power under certain conditions, the enforcement of patents in courts, and patent 
length. Each of these categories is worth one point in the index. Higher values in this 
index reflect stronger patent protection.
The IPR data is available in five year intervals starting in 1965. A recent update 
of the data included 1995 values and included several additional countries. The 
additional countries were ones that have recently started to embrace a market-oriented 
economy, such as China and the Czech Republic. A cross-sectional study seemed good
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because the data values for each country were relatively stable over time (see Table 10). 
1990 seemed to be a good choice for the IPR data because the data values were relatively 
new and were part of the original study.
Table 2 describes the distribution of this variable. The column on the right is 
based on the 90-country sample used in this study, which is limited due to missing data in 
other categories. Countries that had missing data tended to have lower IPR scores.
Table 2: Distribution of the intellectual property rights index
Distribution of IPR index in Distribution of IPR index
Quantile 1990 in 1990, Limited Sample
Max 4.52 4.5:-
Q3 3.01 3.16
Median 2.52 2.57
Q1 1.90 1.98
Min 0 0.33
Variance .919 0.726
The IPR index assigns one point in each of the five categories. No countries 
received a perfect score. Several countries received zeros from 1965 to 1990 (Angola, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Papau New Guinea, and Ethiopia). Of these, only two (Angola, 
Papau New Guinea) were included in the study, because of missing data in other 
categories. The United States received the highest score in 1990, as well as most other 
years covered by the index.
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Table 3: Variable Descriptions
Variable Original variable 
name
Description
Growth95
School_1990
Invest95
IPR_1990
IPR_xxxx
GDP85
Growth90
GRWB7
LSM90
INVWB7
RGDPL85
GRWB6
Economic growth rate, from 1990 to 1995; 
Converted to a percentage 
High school attainment rate in adult male 
population, 1990
Average investment as a proportion of GDP, from 
1990 to 1995; Converted to a percentage 
Ginarte-Park Intellectual Property Right (IPR) 
index in 1990
Ginarte-Park Intellectual Property Right (IPR) 
index in another year
Real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
the year 1985, from Barro-Lee data set. (Variable 
has been scaled by dividing it by 100,000.) 
Economic growth rate, from 1985 to 1990; 
Converted to a percentage
Table 3 summarizes the meaning of the basic variables to be used in the models in
this paper. The original variable names have been included (where possible) so that my 
research can be replicated.
Model 1: Economic growth modeled on high school attainment, recent investment, and
an intellectual property protection index_______________________________________
Growth95 = -1.49 + .0791 School_1990 + 0.199 Invest95 -  1.33 IPR1990
_________ (-1.37) (3.95)____________ (5.26)________ (-4.22)_________________
Observations Used: 90 
R2: .4669
Model 1 is a good basic model, and shows the relationship between economic 
growth, investment, and intellectual property protection. Each of the variables is 
significant well below the 1% level of significance. The other two variables maintain 
their positive coefficient, so the model does have some good explanatory power. The R 
value is now about .47, so it explains a little less than half of the variation in growth rates. 
90 observations were used in this model.
The negative coefficient for the intellectual property rights index is unexpected, 
and is an interesting finding. In this project I was initially expecting to obtain either a
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significantly positive or an insignificant coefficient for the intellectual property rights 
variable. A positive value would have shown that the results of stronger intellectual 
property protection, as measured by this index, results in more economic growth. It 
would have shown that the effects of the increased incentives to innovate are stronger 
than the deadweight loss resulting from increased patent protection. This negative 
coefficient shows that stronger intellectual property protection is statistically associated 
with slower economic growth. For many countries, the negative effects of patent 
protection, including deadweight loss, seem to be outweighing the positive effects.
An important issue is whether convergence plays a role in the model. The theory 
of convergence says that countries that are relatively more advanced should grow more 
slowly than countries that are less advanced. It mainly applies to countries that are 
experiencing rapid growth as a result of modernization efforts. As their GDP capita 
approaches the level of the leading economies, their growth rate slows down. Countries 
with stronger economies also tend to have stronger intellectual-property systems. If 
convergence is an issue, then Model 1 can be called into question, because it does not 
include a GDP per capita variable. I don’t know whether countries with stronger IPR 
values are growing slower because of deadweight loss from IPR protection, or whether 
they are growing relatively slower because of the effects of convergence.
Model 2: Using a static GDP variable to control for convergence
Growth95 =-1.43 + .071 School 1990 + .201 Invest95 - 1.38 IPR 1990
(-1.3 ) (2.79) (5.27) (-4.21)
+ 4.208 GDP85
(0.52)
Observations Used: 90
R2: .4686
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In Model 2 the t-value for the GDP per capita variable is .52, which is positive 
and statistically insignificant. If convergence is a major issue, the coefficient would be 
negative and statistically significant. During this five year period, and among the limited 
sample, the economies of most countries are not observed to be converging.
Instead of demonstrating convergence, Model 2 suggests that countries that have 
strong economies grow slightly faster on average than countries that have weak ones.
This is not a statistically significant finding at the 10% level of significance, or the focus 
of the paper. The low t-value of .52 suggests that random error is about twice as much as 
the coefficient. More importantly, the coefficient of the IPR variable is still negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, when the static GDP variable is 
included.
As noted earlier, the 1990 IPR data does not include the transitional economies 
that were later added to the data. If the focus of the paper is to prove or disprove 
convergence, it would be beneficial to use the 1995 IPR data and include the transitional 
economies. I also would need to develop a different sort of model, which would explain 
and quantify the advantages that higher income societies have in terms of producing 
economic growth. This would show whether a well developed IPR system is one of the 
advantages of a high income society.
The biggest advantage higher income societies have is their ability to reinvest 
their income in growth-engendering areas such as education. The coefficient that 
changes the most between Model 1 and Model 2 belongs to the education variable. Some 
of the economic growth that is attributed to the education variable in Model 1 is being 
attributed to the initial per capita income variable in Model 2.
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The discussion above implies that there is a relationship between the education 
variable, the static GDP variable, and the potential for GDP growth. There doesn’t 
appear to be a similar relationship between the IPR variable and the static GDP variable. 
More importantly, the coefficient of the IPR variable changes only slightly when the 
GDP per capita variable is added. The coefficient of the investment variable is affected 
even less, though it is not the variable being studied.
An idea similar to the idea of convergence is the idea that an economy will 
continue to grow at a similar rate to which it is currently growing. To put this differently, 
economic growth will follow a trend, and the trend will usually change gradually. This 
trend can be affected by many factors. Some economies are stagnating, or shrinking, 
because of an internal problem, but the problem can be different in each country. Instead 
of labeling each problem, and trying to find data, it is easier to just declare that there is a 
trend. Models 3 and 4 include a lagged economic growth variable, so that this trend is 
taken into account.
Model 3: Including a lagged growth variable instead o f a static GDP variable
Growth95 = -.494 + .068 School 1990 + .155 Invest95 - 1.35 IPR 1990
(-.44) (3.38) (3.78) (-4.4)
+ .231 Growth90
(2.44)
Observations Used: 90
R2: .5017
All variables in Model 3 are significant at the 1% level of significance. The 
lagged GDP growth variable has a positive coefficient, and shows that historical growth 
is positively associated with current growth. Model 4 adds the initial GDP per capita 
variable back in, in order to account for both the recent growth trend and any 
convergence effect.
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Model 4: Including a lagged growth variable along with a static GDP variable 
Growth95 = -.457 + .062 School_1990 + .157 Invest95 -  1.38IPR_1990 
(-.4) (2.47) (3.79) (-4.35)
+ 3.11 GDP85 + .228 Growth90
___________(-39) (2.4)______________________________________
Observations Used: 90
R-Squared value: .503_______________________________________________
Again, in Model 4 only the static GDP variable is insignificant. Adding this 
variable to Model 3 does not change the t-value of the IPR variable by very much. The 
education variable is affected more, especially the t-value.
Models 1-4 do not have any problems with multicollinearity or 
heteroschedasticity. Model 4’s highest collinearity diagnostic is 14. For each of the 
other models, the highest collinearity diagnostics are 11.74,12.84, and 12.88, 
respectively. The Chi-squared value associated a heteroschedastity test on Model 4 is 18. 
Models 1, 2, and 3 have Chi-squared statistics of 7.29, 11.76 and 13.3, respectively.
In the next table, Model 4 is compared to a few simplified models that include the
intellectual rights index. T-values are shown in parenthesis.
Table 4: Several simplified models compared with Model 4
A B C Model 4
Intercept 2.93 -0.494 2.96 -.457
(4.09) (-0.45) (3.95) (-•4)
School_1990 — — 0.0839 .062
— — (3.2) (2.47)
Invest95 — 0.158 _ _ .157
— (3.98) — (3.79)
IPR_1990 -1.174 -1.028 -1.651 -1.38
(-3.74) (-3.48) (-4.95) (-4.35)
GDP 8 5 15.21 14.44 -0.172 3.11
(2.28) (2.32) (-0.02) (.39)
Growth90 0.442 0.248 0.388 .228
(5.13) (2.63) (4.23) (2.4)
R2 .314 .411 .270 .501
Observations Used 102 102 97 90
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From Table 4 we can conclude that the short term effect of intellectual property 
rights protection seems to be negative. When the model accounts for investment and 
educational attainment, countries that have high rates of intellectual property protection 
are predicted, on average, to have lower rates of growth. When the model does not 
account for either investment or educational attainment, or both, countries that have high 
rates of intellectual property protection are still predicted to have lower rates of growth. 
In contrast, the coefficient of the static GDP variable is only significant when the 
education variable is not in the model. (The investment variable has a similar effect on 
the intercept coefficient.)
Table 5 displays the correlation statistics between the variables. The correlation 
is relatively high between the GDP per capita variable (GDP85) and the education 
variable (School_1990) is quite high, leading to some multi-collinearity when both are 
included in the same model. There is also some correlation between IPR and GDP per 
capita and between IPR and education.
In Table 5, the education variable is positively correlated with both the initial 
GDP per capita, and the economic growth in the two successive 5 year periods. Perhaps 
there is a circular relationship between initial real GDP per capita, educational 
attainment, and economic growth rates.
Countries that have strong economies also value education. As their income 
continues to increase, more resources can be spent on education. With an adequate level 
of education, a country can absorb technology from other countries. Countries with 
relatively advanced educational systems will have the ability to shift the technological
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frontier. They can also absorb and reproduce technologies that originate from other high
tech countries, as long as their educational systems stay up to date.
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
School_
Growth95 1990 Invest95 IPRJL990 GDP85 Growth90
Growth95 1 0.25487 0.53846 -0.09362 0.15004 0.46399
0.0148 <.0001 0.3421 0.1284 <.0001
105 91 104 105 104 102
School_
1990 0.25487 1 0.25885 0.5131 0.73832 0.34455
0.0148 0.0127 <.0001 <.0001 0.0008
91 95 92 95 95 92
Invest95 0.53846 0.25885 1 0.01001 0.12837 0.53267
<.0001 0.0127 0.9185 0.1897 <.0001
104 92 107 107 106 104
IPRJL990 -0.09362 0.5131 0.01001 1 0.52903 0.10525
0.3421 <.0001 0.9185 <.0001 0.2852
105 95 107 110 109 105
GDP85 0.15004 0.73832 0.12837 0.52903 1 0.24362
0.1284 <.0001 0.1897 <.0001 0.0123
104 95 106 109 109 105
Growth90 0.46399 0.34455 0.53267 0.10525 0.24362 1
<.0001 0.0008 <.0001 0.2852 0.0123
102 92 104 105 105 105
In Table 5, note that the IPR variable from 1990 has a weak negative correlation 
with the growth in the period from 1990 to 1995, but a weak positive correlation with 
growth in the period from 1985 to 1990. This information should be interpreted according 
to the time in which it takes place. The growth from 1985 to 1990 precedes the level of 
intellectual property protection in 1990. Perhaps countries are more likely to implement
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or maintain a stronger IPR system if they already have a strong economy. Then, the
stronger IPR system causes the country’s growth rate to slow down slightly.
To further test this model, I introduce a few interaction terms. Table 6 defines
interaction terms between IPR, investment, and education.
Table 6: Definition of interaction terms 
IPRJnvest = IPRJ990 * Invest95
IPR School = IPR 1990* School 1990 ____________ _
The most important term here is the interaction between the IPR index and the 
education variable. Education, combined with intellectual property protection, should 
result in more patentable innovations, and therefore more economic growth. The negative 
side effects may also be stronger, even at higher levels of education. If the overall effect 
of intellectual property protection is positive, then the interaction between education and 
IPR should also be positive. However, the models above show intellectual property 
protection to have a negative effect on economic growth.
The next model tests whether an exception to this rule exists. Some countries may 
be affected negatively by IPR, and others positively, based on different levels of 
education or investment. If the effect of IPR can be shown to vary according to such 
factors, then it would be reasonable for different countries to implement different 
intellectual property systems, according to their situation.
Table 7 introduces these interaction variables into models. The models show that 
the interaction variables listed above are not significant. The T-values, shown in 
parenthesis, are both less than 1 in absolute value. None of these values are significant at 
the 10% level of significance. Adding either of these variables does not increase 
appreciably the R value.
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Table 7: Interaction between IPR and education and investment
Interaction Model 1 Interaction Model 2
Intercept -0.720 -0.820
(-.48) (-.3)
School 1990 0.076 0.063
(1.32) (2.44)
Invest95 0.156 0.174
(3.74) (1.43)
IPR_1990 -1.286 -1.244
(-2.67) (-1.22)
GDP85 3.548 2.922
(.44) (-36)
Growth90 0.230 0.229
(2.4) (2.39)
IPR_School -0.00478 -
(-.27) -
IPRJnvest - -0.66502
- (-.15)
R2 0.5031 0.5028
Observations Used 90 90
We can conclude that none of these interaction variables add much to the model.
A negative interaction appears to exist between IPR and schooling, and between IPR and 
investment, although neither is statistically significant. Removing these interaction 
variables from the model returns us to the model which was discussed previously in this 
paper..
Table 8 divides the sample into two groups, based on IPR protection level. 
Countries with an IPR value less than or equal to the median are assigned to group A, 
while countries with IPR greater than the median are put in group B. Comparing the two 
groups, I anticipate a stronger negative correlation between increased IPR and economic 
growth in group B, because countries in this group have IPR protection that is already too 
strong, based on previous models.
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Table 8: Comparing the marginal effect of intellectual property on two groups of countries. One 
group has low levels of intellectual-property protection, and the other has relatively high levels of 
intellectual property protection.
Group A (IPR <= 2.52) Group B (IPR > 2.52)
Intercept -1.342 -1.389
(-.87) (-.57)
School_1990 0.120 0.02'
(2.77) (•7)
Invest95 0.183 0.109
(3.4) (1.76)
IPR_1990 -1.235 -0.65-
(-2.21) (-.89)
GDP85 -20.021 7.324
(-1.1) (.7?)
Growth90 0.055 0.476
(.44) (3.T!)
R2: .45 .56
Observations Used: 44 46
Table 8 shows that the intellectual property rights variable has a much smaller
effect in group B, compared to Models 1 though 4. Group A also has a smaller 
coefficient for this variable, compared to Models 1 through 4, but not as small as in 
Group B. The IPR variable in Group A is significant at the 10% level, and also at the 5% 
level. In Group B, IPR is not significant at either level. These findings suggest that 
Group A countries should not increase intellectual property protection but does not
suggest that Group B countries should reduce IPR protection.
Table 9: More details on Model 4
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr>|t|
Estimate Error
Intercept -0.45717 1.13917 -0.4 0.6892
School 1990 0.0619 0.02504 2.47 0.0154
Invest95 0.15693 0.04145 3.79 0.0003
IPR_1990 -1.38388 0.31828 -4.35 <.0001
GDP85 3.112 7.91271 0.39 0.6951
Growth90 0.22842 0.09524 2.4 0.0187
R2 .5027
Observations Used 90
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This paper’s models imply that an increase in intellectual property protection 
should decrease the amount of economic growth per capita. The data that was used to 
generate the models shows that most countries kept their intellectual property protection 
relatively stable. Some countries increased the level of protection one year, but then they 
would keep the level of protection constant for the next 5, 10, or 15 years. Very few 
countries decreased their level of intellectual property protection, and none of them 
eliminated it completely in a certain year.
Table 10: Changes in IPR protection, between each of the five year observations in the 
Ginarte-Park index. Counts are based on the 90 observations used in Models 1-4.
Time Period 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990-
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Increases 23 31 6 34 13 9 47
Decreases 1 7 2 5 2 4 1
Models 1 through 4 use the IPR index from 1990 as the independent variable. In 
1990, only nine countries had higher values in the IPR index then they had in 1985, and 
four countries had lower values than they did in 1985. The remaining 77 countries had 
the same values in 1990 as they did in 1985. Between 1980 and 1985, 15 countries either 
increased or decreased their IPR protection, while the remaining 75 countries in the 
sample maintained their IPR protection level.
A majority of the countries did not change their IPR protection, at least in a way 
that affects the index value, between 1980 and 1990. Others changed, but often only by a 
small amount. So, the use of the “IPR 1990” variable to help model per capita growth 
between 1990 and 1995 does not separate the short term effect on growth from the long 
term effect.
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Conclusion
The various models consistently show that intellectual property protection is 
negatively correlated with economic growth. This finding contradicts previous empirical 
research, and suggests a new path for the development of intellectual property rights.
The models can be used to promote reductions in intellectual property protection, 
but only with some cautions. Most countries in the data set kept their intellectual 
property systems the same over long periods of time. Among those that changed their 
level of intellectual property protection, more increased the level over time, but usually 
very slowly. Even so, the models demonstrate that an individual country can lose by 
strengthening its intellectual property system. Once an intellectual property system is 
developed, or once it is strengthened to a certain level, an expectation is created that the 
system will remain in place for a long time.
While broad changes are not recommended, small periodic adjustments are 
necessary to keep the various intellectual property institutions relevant. The example I 
gave relates to computer technology, but other situations will arise which require a 
reaction from policy makers in the government. These adjustments should be 
accompanied by decreases rather than increases in intellectual property protection. This 
may cause inventors to get less economic rent from individual inventions, but over time it 
will lead to higher economic growth rates.
Another word of caution is that the models test the effect of intellectual property 
systems on an average individual country, not all countries as a group, and not any
29
particular country. The optimal solution should be different in every country, depending 
on the current level of development, especially the level of education. The use of an 
index in this paper prevented me from studying individual issues, such as patent length 
and participation in international intellectual-property agreements.
When negotiating multilateral trade agreements, the United States should allow 
some countries to set their own level of intellectual property protection. Some countries 
are both too poor to pay for technologies imported from abroad. Other countries are at a 
level of development where they cannot generate many innovations on their own, 
regardless of the existence of an intellectual property system.
Once a country reaches a certain level of development, it is able to contribute to 
the generation of new ideas and technology. Therefore, the United States should try to 
negotiate so that each country will contribute as it is able.
The intellectual property system is currently the primary way governments 
encourage innovation and technological growth. This paper shows that the system has 
strong side effects for the individual country. In conducting trade negotiations, a few 
countries may therefore be unwilling to strengthen their protection of intellectual 
property. This is acceptable, as long as they are willing to develop their own method for 
encouraging innovation.
Such changes in intellectual property law should never be retroactive, of course. 
That would be fraudulent. The inventions in the recent past were made to receive certain 
rewards, so the reward structure for those should be maintained as long as the existing 
law promised they would be maintained.
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Appendix 1
The following table shows the data values for all countries that had Ginarte-Park 
IPR data available in 1990. The left-most column is the truncated country name as it 
appears in my data file. Many countries have two commonly-used names, which made 
merging the data more difficult. The second column is the three-letter abbreviation 
assigned to the country by the World Bank. The other six columns contain the variables 
that were used in the models, as defined in Table 3.
Country
Name
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
Growth
95
Growth
90
School
1990
Invest
95 GDP85 IPR 1990
ANGOLA AGO -6.33 15.58 0.00711 0
ARGENTIN ARG 4.59 -1.17 26.2 16.7 0.05324 2.26
AUSTRALI AUS 2.32 1.09 40.8 20.66 0.13583 3.32
AUSTRIA AUT 1.15 2.59 69.2 24 0.11131 4.24
BURUNDI BDI -4.34 0.77 3.5 14.04 0.00527 2.86
BELGIUM BEL 0.88 2.85 32.7 18.69 0.11285 3.9
BENIN BEN 1.32 -2.53 14 14.72 0.01108 2.86
BURKINA BFA 0.99 0.37 20.3 0.00495 2.24
BANGLADE BGD 2.76 1.81 21.9 18.89 0.01216 1.99
BOLIVIA BOL 1.66 -0.8 19.6 15.15 0.01754 1.98
BRAZIL BRA 1.65 0.04 8.7 20.37 0.04017 1.85
BOTSWANA BWA 1.49 5.55 14.3 28.86 0.02337 1.9
CENTRAL CAF -1.1 -1.88 11.9 11.75 0.0063 2.57
CANADA CAN 0.24 1.72 32.2 18.61 0.15589 2.76
SWITZERL CHE -1.01 2.02 53.4 23.48 0.14864 3.8
CHILE CHL 6.97 4.3 34.3 24.41 0.03467 2.41
IVORY CO CIV -1.27 -5.54 8.36 0.01545 2.52
CAMEROON CMR -4.51 -5.5 9.9 16.13 0.01487 2.57
CONGO COG -2.3 -3.74 30 28.41 0.02697 2.57
COLOMBIA COL 2.67 2.66 17.7 19.23 0.02968 1.12
COSTA Rl CRI 2.56 2 10.7 27.57 0.03184 1.47
CYPRUS CYP 5.52 37.6 25.61 0.06486 2.24
GERMANY DEU 0.88 22.57 3.71
DENMARK DNK 1.78 1.41 56.8 14.99 0.12969 3.9
DOMINICA DOM 2.27 -0.06 11.5 24.3 0.02111 2.41
ALGERIA DZA -2.08 -2.76 11.6 30.25 0.02988 3.38
ECUADOR ECU 1.23 -0.71 10.4 20.19 0.02913 1.54
EGYPT EGY 1.3 0.48 21.7 20.19 0.01953 1.99
SPAIN ESP 1.15 4.18 28.4 22.5 0.07536 3.62
ETHIOPIA ETH 0.82 0.12 12.06 0.00299 0
FINLAND FIN -0.91 3.03 49.4 19.06 0.12051 2.95
FIJI FJI 0.89 2.52 34.1 14.65 0.03281 2.01
FRANCE FRA 0.61 2.37 39.9 19.75 0.12206 3.9
GABON GAB 0.43 -3 22.98 0.04072 2.57
UNITED K GBR 0.96 2.84 35.2 16.29 0.11237 3.57
GHANA GHA 1.48 1.25 30.6 17.86 0.00792 2.9
GREECE GRC 1.01 1.19 34.2 21.17 0.06224 2.32
GRENADA GRD 0.73 6.17 34.48 0.01873 1.7
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Country
Name
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
Growth
95
Growth
90
School
1990
Invest
95 GDP85 IPR 1990
GUATEMAL GTM 1.61 0 6 15.83 0.0209 1.08
GUYANA GUY 6.35 -2.1 30.6 24.68 0.01265 1.42
HONG KON HKG 3.78 6.68 46.9 28.51 0.10599 2.57
HONDURAS HND 0.61 -0.01 9.5 28.94 0.01387 1.76
HAITI HTI -4.99 -2.95 12.8 7 0.00911 3.19
INDONESI IDN 6.03 4.2 21.4 29.49 0.01651 0.33
INDIA IND 3.49 3.87 19.8 22.79 0.0105 1.48
IRELAND IRL 5.34 4.91 41.9 17.22 0.07275 2.99
IRAN IRN 2.86 -5.16 24.8 30.14 0.04043 2.38
IRAQ IRQ -15.88 20.3 0.04249 2.46
ICELAND ISL -0.32 1.82 36.5 17.08 0.12209 2.12
ISRAEL ISR 2.99 2.17 35.1 24.93 0.0831 3.57
ITALY ITA 0.96 2.84 35.2 19.07 0.10808 4.05
JAMAICA JAM 0.09 3.19 27.8 31.04 0.02215 2.86
JORDAN JOR 2 0.18 23.8 32.83 0.03561 1.86
JAPAN JPN 1.12 4.02 41.5 30.72 0.11771 3.94
KENYA KEN -1.25 1.92 10.6 19.98 0.00794 2.57
KOREA KOR 6.46 8.66 57.6 36.71 0.04217 3.94
LIBERIA LBR 16 0.00853 2.19
SRI LANK LKA 4.05 1.78 37.7 24.39 0.02045 3.12
LUXEMBOU LUX 4.01 3.76 22.81 0.13175 3.05
MOROCCO MAR -0.71 1.67 22.99 0.01956 2.38
MADAGASC MDG -2.89 -0.4 11.76 0.00769 1.86
MEXICO MEX -0.21 -0.42 23.6 22.5 0.05621 1.63
MALI MU 0.51 1.45 3.9 19.72 0.00532 2.57
MALTA MLT 4.27 5.33 35.3 30.56 0.05321 1.89
MYANMAR MMR 18.8 13.41 0.00599 0
MOZAMBIQ MOZ 1.2 1.3 2.5 15.95 0.00749 0
MAURITAN MRT 1 0.2 6.1 19.26 0.00824 2.57
MAURITIU MUS 3.7 7.56 37.3 30.38 0.04226 2.89
MALAWI MWI 0.35 -0.69 7.4 20.87 0.00518 3.24
MALAYSIA MYS 6.05 4.24 33.7 36.37 0.04146 2.37
NIGER NER -2.48 -1.5 2 7.76 0.00559 2.24
NIGERIA NGA -0.4 1.64 20.58 0.01062 3.05
NICARAGU NIC -1.23 -5.62 8.1 19.87 0.0179 0.92
NETHERLA NLD 1.43 2.14 45.7 20.35 0.11539 4.24
NORWAY NOR 3.12 0.56 71.7 21.85 0.14144 3.29
NEPAL NPL 2.64 1.96 13.3 21.19 0.00936 2.52
NEW ZEAL NZL 1.72 -0.17 20.4 18.98 0.11443 3.32
PAKISTAN PAK 2.28 2.49 21.3 16.15 0.01262 1.99
PANAMA PAN 3.61 -3.57 28.2 20.87 0.03499 2.41
PERU PER 4.62 -3.85 25.3 18.98 0.02565 1.02
PHILIPPI PHL -0.12 2.14 29.1 22.75 0.01542 2.67
PAPUA NE PNG 5.64 -1.34 7.7 21.92 0.01619 0
PORTUGAL PRT 1.7 4.96 17 25.65 0.0507 1.98
PARAGUAY PRY 0.53 0.89 21.7 21.72 0.02072 1.8
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Country
Name
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
Growth
95
Growth
90
School
1990
Invest
95 GDP85 IPR 1990
RWANDA RWA -3.38 -3.6 2.5 12.41 0.00776 2.86
SAUDI AR SAU -0.89 0.1 21.46 0.08313 2.05
SUDAN SDN 6.73 8.2 0.00791 3.52
SENEGAL SEN -1.09 0.47 6.1 14.36 0.01163 2.57
SINGAPOR SGP 6.5 5.94 31.9 35.33 0.08616 2.57
SIERRA L SLE -7.05 -0.18 7.2 8.76 0.00905 2.52
EL SALVA SLV 4.03 0.17 9.9 17.24 0.01831 2.19
SOMALIA SOM -1.9 15.5 0.00653 1.8
SWEDEN SWE -0.12 1.57 45.1 16.63 0.13451 3.9
SWAZI LAN SWZ -0.48 4.35 18.1 25 0.02198 2.19
SYRIA SYR 4.24 0.18 19 22.5 0.0424 2.46
CHAD TCD 3.77 0.14 11.33 0.00409 2.71
TOGO TGO -2.56 -1.1 18.7 15.49 0.00637 2.24
THAILAND THA 7.14 7.9 9 40.87 0.02463 1.85
TRINIDAD TTO 0.9 -3.69 32.3 15.45 0.09701 3.01
TUNISIA TUN 2.02 1.11 18.4 27.2 0.02758 1.9
TURKEY TUR 1.43 3.58 15.4 24 0.03077 1.8
TANZANIA TZA -0.66 1.21 25.32 0.00473 2.9
UGANDA UGA 3.7 1.84 14.5 14.73 0.0054 2.57
URUGUAY URY 3 3.01 23.9 13.22 0.03969 2.26
UNITED S USA 1.05 1.61 33.7 16.32 0.1657 4.52
VENEZUEL VEN 1.17 0.09 11.9 17.11 0.06225 1.35
SOUTH AF ZAF -1.25 -0.85 21.6 15.77 0.03322 3.57
ZAIRE ZAR -10 -2.54 15.5 6.24 0.00442 2.86
ZAMBIA ZMB -2.91 -1.86 19.4 13.76 0.00808 3.52
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.6 0.2 26 20.73 0.01216 2.9
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Appendix 2
The following table shows the values for the Ginarte-Park IPR index, for all 
countries that there is data available. The country names are in the first column, in a 
truncated form, as they appear in my data file. The second column contains the three 
letter code assigned to the country by the World Bank. The other eight columns contain 
the Ginarte-Park index data, with the variable names broken up into two lines. The 
variable IPR_1960, for example, refers to the index value in 1960. Countries with 
missing data between 1960 and 1990 were referred to as transitional economies.
Country Name 
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
IPR
1960
IPR
1965
IPR
1970
IPR
1975
IPR
1980
IPR
1985
IPR
1990
IPR
1995
ANGOLA AGO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.65
ARGENTIN ARG 1.93 1.93 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 3.19
AUSTRALI AUS 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.23 3.23 3.32 3.86
AUSTRIA AUT 3.38 3.38 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.81 4.24 4.57
BURUNDI BDI 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86
BELGIUM BEL 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 4.05 3.9 3.9
BENIN BEN 2.05 2.05 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.86 2.86
BURKINA BFA 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.57
BANGLADE BGD 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 2.32
BULGARIA BGR 2.57
BOLIVIA BOL 2.12 2.12 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 2.31
BRAZIL BRA 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.51 1.85 1.85 1.85 3.05
BOTSWANA BWA 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
CENTRAL CAF 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57
CANADA CAN 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 3.57
SWITZERL CHE 2.38 2.71 3.14 3.14 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.91
CHILE CHL 1.98 1.98 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 3.07
CHINA CHN 1.55
IVORY CO CIV 2.05 2.38 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52
CAMEROON CMR 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57
CONGO COG 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57
COLOMBIA COL 2.08 2.08 1.62 1.8 1.12 1.12 1.12 2.57
COSTA Rl CRI 2.19 2.19 1.76 1.76 1.94 1.47 1.47 1.8
CYPRUS CYP 1.9 1.9 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24
CZECH RE CZE 3.19
GERMANY DEU 2.33 2.66 3.09 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71 3.86
DENMARK DNK 2.33 2.66 2.8 2.8 3.62 3.76 3.9 4.05
DOMINICA DOM 2.26 2.26 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41
ALGERIA DZA 3.05 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38
ECUADOR ECU 1.94 1.94 1.66 1.66 1.54 1.54 1.54 2.71
EGYPT EGY 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
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Country Name 
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
IPR
1960
IPR
1965
IPR
1970
IPR
1975
IPR
1980
IPR
1985
IPR
1990
IPR
1995
SPAIN ESP 2.95 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62 4.05
ETHIOPIA ETH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FINLAND FIN 1.99 1.99 2.14 2.14 2.95 2.95 2.95 4.19
FIJI FJI 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01
FRANCE FRA 2.76 3.1 3.24 3.24 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.05
GABON GAB 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57
UNITED K GBR 2.7 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57
GHANA GHA 2.23 2.23 2.37 2.37 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.07
GREECE GRC 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.32 2.65
GRENADA GRD 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
GUATEMAL GTM 1.94 1.94 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.75 1.08 1.08
GUYANA GUY 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42
HONG KON HKG 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.04 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57
HONDURAS HND 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 1.76 1.76 1.76 2.1
HAITI HTI 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19 3.19
HUNGARY HUN 3.37
INDONESI IDN 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.24
INDIA IND 1.85 1.85 1.42 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.48 1.51
IRELAND IRL 2.23 2.56 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 3.32
IRAN IRN 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38
IRAQ IRQ 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46
ICELAND ISL 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.45
ISRAEL ISR 3.04 3.37 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57
ITALY ITA 2.99 3.32 3.32 3.46 3.71 4.05 4.05 4.19
JAMAICA JAM 3.09 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86
JORDAN JOR 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86 2.19
JAPAN JPN 2.85 3.18 3.32 3.61 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94
KENYA KEN 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.9
KOREA KOR 2.8 2.8 2.94 2.94 3.28 3.61 3.94 4.2
LIBERIA LBR 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.86
SRI LANK LKA 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.79 3.12 3.12 3.12
LITHUANI LTU 2.9
LUXEMBOU LUX 2.29 2.29 2.71 2.71 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05
MOROCCO MAR 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38
MADAGASC MDG 1.05 1.38 1.52 1.52 1.86 1.86 1.86 2.27
MEXICO MEX 1.7 1.7 1.99 1.99 1.4 1.4 1.63 2.86
MALI MLI 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.57 2.57 2.57
MALTA MLT 1.56 1.56 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
MYANMAR MMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MOZAMBIQ MOZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAURITAN MRT 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57
MAURITIU MUS 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.89 2.89 2.89 2.89
MALAWI MWI 2.37 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.04 3.24 3.24 3.24
MALAYSIA MYS 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.57 2.9 2.37 2.85
NIGER NER 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.57
NIGERIA NGA 2.71 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05
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Country Name 
(Truncated)
World
Bank
Code
IPR
1960
IPR
1965
IPR
1970
IPR
1975
IPR
1980
IPR
1985 CD CD 
73 
O
I IPR
1995
NICARAGU NIC 1.78 1.78 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
NETHERLA NLD 2.95 3.29 3.61 3.47 4.24 4.24 4.24 4.38
NORWAY NOR 2.66 2.66 2.8 2.8 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.9
NEPAL NPL 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52
NEW ZEAL NZL 2.85 3.18 3.18 3.18 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.86
PAKISTAN PAK 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
PANAMA PAN 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 3.52
PERU PER 1.17 1.17 1.31 1.31 1.02 1.02 1.02 2.71
PHILIPPI PHL 2.19 2.52 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
PAPUA NE PNG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POLAND POL 2.9
PORTUGAL PRT 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 2.98
PARAGUAY PRY 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.8
ROMANIA ROM 2.71
RUSSIAN RUS 3.04
RWANDA RWA 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.86 2.86 2.86
SAUDI AR SAU 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
SUDAN SDN 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 3.52 3.52 3.52
SENEGAL SEN 1.76 2.1 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.57 2.57 2.57
SINGAPOR SGP 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.57 2.57 2.57 3.9
SIERRA L SLE 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.52
EL SALVA SLV 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.86
SOMALIA SOM 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
SLOVAK R SVK 3.19
SWEDEN SWE 2.33 2.66 2.8 2.8 3.47 3.47 3.9 4.24
SWAZI LAN SWZ 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.86
SYRIA SYR 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46
CHAD TCD 2.05 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.71
TOGO TGO 1.9 1.9 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.57
THAILAND THA 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.24
TRINIDAD TTO 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.35
TUNISIA TUN 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
TURKEY TUR 1.65 1.65 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
TANZANIA TZA 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
UGANDA UGA 2.04 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.9
UKRAINE UKR 3.04
URUGUAY URY 1.79 1.79 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.6
UNITED S USA 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52 4.86
VENEZUEL VEN 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 2.9
VIETNAM VNM '
SOUTH AF ZAF 3.04 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57
ZAIRE ZAR 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86
ZAMBIA ZMB 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52
ZIMBABWE ZWE 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
39
Appendix 3 
Convergence Problem
In Model 2, the variable GDP85 has a positive coefficient, which is unexpected. 
Models 5-9 are presented here in order to answer any questions about the possible 
relationship between convergence and IPR. Models 5-7 are based on Models 2-4, but 
with the IPR variable removed. Models 8 and 9 introduce an interaction term between 
GDP85 and Growth90.
Model 5: Model 2 without the IPR variable____________________________________
Growth95 = -4.531 + .038 School_1990 + .240 Invest95 -  3.999 GDP85
(-5.13) (1.45) (5.93) (-.46)____________________________________
Observations Used: 90
R-Squared value: .358______________________________________________________
Removing the IPR variable from Model 2 causes the GDP85 coefficient to 
become negative. It means that higher income countries tend to have slower growth 
rates. This effect is weak, and has a t-value less than one. When the IPR variable is 
included (such as in Model 2), higher income countries are not observed to always have 
slower growth rates.
Model 6: Model 3 without the IPR variable
Growth95 = -3.655 + .018 School_1990 + .202 Invest95 + .220 Growth90 
(-3.80) (0.97) (4.62) (2.11)
Observations Used: 90
R-Squared value: .388__________________________ ____________________________
Removing the IPR variable from Model 3 has little effect on the coefficient or t- 
value of the lagged economic growth variable. The effect of schooling seems to be 
especially weak in this model.
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Model 7: Model 4 without the IPR variable
Growth95 = -3.600 + .029 School_1990 + .197 Invest95 -  5.122 GDP85 
(3.72) (1.11) (4.43) (-0.61)
+ .224 Growth90
(2-14)________________________________________________
Observations Used: 90
R-Squared value: .391__________________________________________
In Model 7, the static GDP variable again has a negative coefficient, and a t-value 
less than one. In Model 7, higher income countries seem to grow slower then slower 
income ones. The effect is slightly stronger in Model 7 than in Model 5, which does not 
include a lagged economic-growth variable.
Model 8: Model 5 without the IPR variable______________________________
Growth95 = -3.674 + .032 School_1990 + .189 Invest95 + 5.045 GDP85 + .492 
Growth90
(-3.88) (1.26) (4.33) (.54) (3.13)
-7.012 GDPGrowth
(-2.24)_________________________________________________________
Observations Used: 90
R-Squared value: .425________________________________________________
In Model 8, GDP Growth has negative coefficient, significant at the 10 % level 
of significance, just like in Model 5. In Model 8, unlike in Models 5 and 7, GDP85 has a 
positive coefficient. This is more similar to that of Models 2 and 4, which have an IPR 
variable included. The coefficient of Growth90 is much stronger than in Model 6 and 7.
Model 8 demonstrates what I would like to call dynamic convergence. Certain 
countries grow faster than other countries, all other things being equal. Other countries 
fall behind, or even experience a period of negative economic growth. Countries in 
general are not observed to be converging, because the countries with advanced 
economies tend to be growing slightly faster, all other things being equal. Those
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